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Abstract 
The harm that each individual causes others is unverifiable in some circumstances where 
the total harm caused by everyone is verifiable. For example, the environmental agency 
can often measure the total harm caused by pollution much easier than it can measure the 
harm caused by each individual polluter. In these circumstances, implementing the usual 
liability rules or externality taxes is impossible. We propose a novel solution: Hold each 
participant in the activity responsible for all of the excessive harm that everyone causes. 
By “excessive harm” we mean the difference between the total harm caused by all 
injurers and the optimal total harm. We call this rule “total liability for excessive harm.” 
We show that total liability for excessive harm creates incentives for efficient precaution 
and activity level. Consequently, actual harm is not excessive and actual liability is nil. 
For example, the environmental agency can set a target for clean air and announce that 
each factory is liable for pollution by all factories that exceeds the target. Since the 
liability rule causes the factories to hit the target, they pay no damages. Thus the 
environmental agency gains control over emissions without having to monitor individual 
polluters, and the polluters do not have to pay damages or conform to bureaucratic 
regulations.  
 
 Total Liability for Excessive Harm 
  
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat*
 
Introduction 
 
The social harm caused by each individual is often “unverifiable,” by which we 
mean “not provable to a third party.” For example, the environmental agency often 
cannot prove the extent of each polluter’s emissions. In these circumstances, 
implementing the usual liability rules or externality taxes is difficult or impossible. For 
example, implementing a rule of strict liability requires verifying the damage that 
individual injurers actually cause. Implementing an externality tax (“Pigouvian tax”) also 
requires verifying the damage that individual injurers actually cause. The same problem 
arises for a negligence rule, a fine for excessive emissions, or a system of transferable 
pollution rights.  
In many circumstances where the individual’s contribution to social harm is 
unverifiable, the total harm caused by everyone is verifiable. For example, the 
environmental agency can usually measure total pollution easier than it can measure the 
harm caused by each individual polluter.  In some circumstances like this, we propose a 
novel rule to control social costs: Hold each participant in the activity responsible for all 
of the excessive harm that everyone causes. By “excessive harm” we mean the difference 
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between the total harm caused by all injurers and the optimal total harm. We call this rule 
“total liability for excessive harm.”  
We will show that total liability for excessive harm creates incentives for efficient 
precaution and activity level. Incentives are efficient because each injurer internalizes the 
full benefit and cost of reducing the harm that he causes. Consequently, actual harm is 
not excessive and actual liability is nil. For example, the environmental agency can set a 
target for clean air and announce that each factory is liable for pollution by all factories 
that exceeds the target. Since the liability rule causes the factories to hit the target, they 
pay no damages. Thus the environmental agency gains control over emissions without 
having to monitor individual polluters, and the polluters do not have to pay damages or 
conform to bureaucratic regulations. 
To illustrate with numbers, assume that 2 factories each emit pollution of 150 into 
a river, and 3 factories each emit pollution of 100, so total pollution equals 600. The 
environmental agency measures total pollution in the river, estimates the socially efficient 
level of pollution, and sets a target of 500. If the environmental agency adopts our 
proposal, it will announce that each factory will be liable for actual pollution that exceeds 
500. For example, if the factories continue polluting as in the past, each of the five 
factories will be liable for 100. As we will show, the factories will respond by reducing 
pollution until its total equals 500.  (The harm function is additive in all of our examples, 
but the propositions that we prove only require a concave harm function.) 
We will show that the rule of total liability for excessive harm is practical under 
three conditions:  (i) total harm is verifiable, (ii) optimal total harm is calculable, and (iii) 
the number of injurers is not too large. In these circumstances, we recommend adopting 
our rule because it usually achieves socially efficient abatement at lower administrative 
and error costs than other liability rules, taxes, fines, or a system of transferable pollution 
rights. 
The rule that we propose has two aspects: “Excessive harm,” refers to the fact that 
the injurer is liable for harm that exceeds a legal target, and “total liability,” refers to the 
fact that each injurer is liable for the harm caused by all injurers. Part I briefly describes 
the origins of these ideas. Part II analyzes “excessive harm.” Part III analyzes “total 
liability.” Part III also develops the important distinction between activity level and 
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participation rate, that existing literature neglects.  Part IV refines the model in several 
ways, including an analysis of irrational or erroneous decision-making, and incentives of 
victims. Part V concerns applications and examples, which illustrate that the rule of total 
liability for excessive harm can sometimes solve the “tragedy of the common.”  After the 
conclusion in Part VI, a mathematical appendix proves the propositions formulated in the 
paper. 
 
I. Origins 
 
Our investigation of the literature found some precedent for the idea of total 
liability and the idea of liability for excessive harm. Although its mathematical 
foundations are old,1 the economic analysis of liability is relatively recent. The economic 
analysis of torts apparently began in the late 1960s and early 1970s.2 Once the foundation 
was in place, many papers extended the economic analysis of liability law, some in ways 
that come close to the idea of total liability.3 For example, some previous papers analyze 
                                                 
1 For a mathematician, much of the economic analysis of liability and taxation, including the idea of total 
liability, is implicitly present in the “marginalist revolution” of the late 19th century. This phrase refers to 
the reworking of economic theory by absorbing calculus into utilitarian reasoning. The marginalist 
revolution made economists appreciate the importance of marginal costs, as opposed to average costs or 
total costs. The derivative of a function does not change when a constant value is added to it. So the inputs 
that maximize a utility function or minimize a cost function do not change when a constant is added to the 
function. The fact that the optimum depends on marginal values, not infra-marginal values, is the germ of 
the idea that total liability creates efficient incentives. 
2 Vickery (1968) is a powerful paper that was not absorbed into the legal literature, whereas Calabresi’s 
book The Costs of Accidents (supra note), was foundational. See W. Vickery, "Automobile Accidents, Tort 
Law, Externalies, and Insurance: An Economist's Critique" 33 Law and Contemporary Problems 465-487 
(1968). Calabresi does not discuss the possibility that liability should rest on more than one actor. Clearly, 
he does not suggest that efficient incentives would be achieved if the injurer and victim each bear 100% of 
the accident’s costs. The developing subject was anticipated and described in Richard Posner’s Economic 
Analysis of Law (1972). The most relevant discussion concerns the rule of negligence with a defense of 
contributory negligence, which occurs in Chapter 4, circa page 70. Posner asks whether efficiency requires 
the injurer or victim to bear the cost of an accident, but he shows no awareness that imposing the cost on 
both of them would provide efficient incentives. The most important break-through in mathematical 
modeling of tort liability was made by Brown, who also does not consider the possibility of total liability: J. 
Brown, "Toward an Economic Theory of Liability" 2 J. Legal Studies 323-349 (1973). 
3Green extended the mathematics. Shavell’s influential paper in 1980 on the distinction between precaution 
and activity level clarified the nature of the problem of incentives for injurer and victim (Calabresi 
discussed it earlier in his book: Clabresi, ibid., pp 114-129). These ideas were subsequently developed in a 
variety of papers where more than one actor influences the probability or magnitude of an accident. These 
papers mostly assumed that injurer’s damages would be paid to the victim as compensation. Subsequently a 
discussion developed as to whether injurer’s liability might be “decoupled” from plaintiff’s recovery. For 
all that, See J. R. Green, "On the Optimal Structure of Liability Laws" 7 The Bell Journal of Economics 
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the incentive effects of different liability rules when several injurers cause the same harm.  
To illustrate, when two cars collide and damage each other, the accident would have been 
avoided if either driver had stayed home. The drivers have efficient incentives if each of 
them must pay 100% of the cost of the harm suffered by both cars. 4  
In addition, some previous papers analyze the incentive effects of different 
liability rules when several injurers harm several victims, but no one can verify which 
injurer caused which victim’s harm. To illustrate, several companies manufacture the 
same drug that causes harm to several users, but the victims cannot prove who 
manufactured the drug that they took.5 The literature on the economic analysis of tort 
liability contains some discussions that come close to, or explicitly mention, what we call 
“total liability”,6 although we know of no formal analysis. 
Unlike tort liability, the literature on externality taxes contains at least one explicit 
analysis of the rule of total liability. An innovative paper by Segerson analyzes the 
consequences of taxing each polluter for total pollution that exceeds the social optimum, 
while also offering a subsidy to each polluter for total pollution that falls short of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
553-574 (1976); Stephen Shavell, "An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of 
Torts" 9 J. Legal Studies 463-516 (1980); A. Leong, "Liability Rules When Injurers as Well As Victims 
Suffer Losses" 9 International Review of Law and Economics 105 (1989); J. H. Arlen, "Re-Examining 
Liability Rules When Injurers as Well as Victims Suffer Losses" 10 International Review of Law and 
Economics 233-239 (1990); A. M. Polinsky and Y. K. Che, "Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for 
Care and Litigation" 22 Rand J. Economics 562-570 (1991).  
 4 Instead, prevalent liability law causes each of them to pay 50% on average. In intriguing research on 
automobile accidents, Edlin attempted to measure the extent of this externality. A motorist who drives more 
miles increases the risk of an accident. Part of this risk translates into higher insurance premiums for others, 
which Edlin calls the “insurance externality.” Part of the external risk, however, does not translate into 
higher insurance premiums. For example, automobile deaths impose some losses of a kind that are 
uninsurable. Edlin considers market and tax mechanisms to make drivers internalize the insurance 
externality and non-insurance externalities that they impose on others. He shows that the revenue capacity 
for this kind of Pigouvian tax is very high in states where roads are congested. Edlin, however, does not 
discuss the rule of total liability for excessive harm.  There is no reason why he should, since total liability 
for excessive harm is impractical when applied to automobile accidents because there are too many 
injurers. 
5 This is the case of separate tortfeasors who are responsible for separate, non-verifiable harms. See Ariel 
Porat and Alex Stein, Tort Liability Under Uncertainty (Oxford University Press, 2001) pp 58-69, 130-159. 
For a discussion of the consequences of a rule of strict total liability, see Golbe and White, supra note.  
6 Posner and Landes (1987) and Shavell (1987) published comprehensive books on tort liability, but we 
cannot find in them the suggestion that several actors who caused separate non-verifiable harms should be 
held liable for the total harm (or excessive total harm) caused by all actors. See W. M. Landes, and R. 
Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (Harvard University Press, 1987). Especially see ibid., 
Chapter 7: “Joint and Multiple Torts”, at pp. 190-227. See also S. Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident 
Law (Harvard University Press, 1987). Especially see ibid., Chapter 2: “Liability and Deterrence: Basic 
Theory”, at pp. 5-46. Unfortunately, there are no comprehensive treatments that are more recent. 
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social optimum.7  In another paper co-authored by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, the 
authors suggest that when firms create externalities which could not be distinguished 
from one another, the state could impose a tax on the firms at the rate of the marginal 
harm, which depends on the total level of the externality.8  
In addition to literature on pollution, a largely independent economic literature on 
the principal-agent problem offers some valuable insights into possibilities resembling 
total liability. A classical paper that explores an analogous problem to the one discusses 
by us is Holmstrom’s paper on "Moral Hazard in Teams". Holmstrom suggests that when 
there are two agents which their outputs are unverifiable, the principal could provide 
them with efficient incentives if he offers them bonuses (or imposes sanctions upon 
them), which correlate to the total output created by both agents. 9   
In brief, some concepts in the existing literature resemble the rule of total liability 
for excessive harm, but existing literature does not systematically analyze it or commend 
it as a practical solution to the problem of social harm. 
 
    
  
                                                 
7 K. Segerson, " Uncertainty and Incentives for Nonpoint Pollution Control” 15 Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 87-98 (1988). Also see T. J. Miceli and K. Segerson, "Joint Liability in Torts: 
Marginal and Infra-Marginal Efficiency" 11 International Review of Law and Economics 235-249 (1991). 
Miceli & Segerson proposed a form of total liability for ambient pollution, according to which under-
achievement of a group’s abatement goal results in a tax and over-achievement results in a subsidy. For 
under-achievement, Miceli & Segerson’s tax has the same consequences as our rule of total liability for 
excessive harm. For over-achievement, however, Miceli & Segerson’s subsidy creates a potentially fatal 
incentive problem. A group that reduces total pollution below the target receives a subsidy equal to a 
multiple of the total benefit created by their over-achievement. Consequently, by over-achieving they 
realize a private gain and cause a social loss. Over-achieving is privately profitable and socially costly. The 
rule of total liability for excessive harm avoids this problem by not paying subsidies for over-achieving 
relative to the target. 
8 Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, “On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation” 4 
American L. & Econ. Rev. 1, 10-11 (2002).  
9 B. Holmstrom, "Moral Hazard in Teams" 13 The Bell Journal of Economics 324-340 (1982). The idea 
takes a somewhat different form in contracts in our theory of “anti-insurance”: Robert Cooter and Ariel 
Porat, “Anti Insurance” 31 J. of Legal Studies 203 (2002). Notice however, that Holmstorm’s paper did not 
distinguish explicitly between situations where the total output is a but-for cause of each agent’s efforts and 
situations where the total output is the sum of separate outputs, each created by different agent. Also notice 
that Holmstorm’s paper did not propose a broad application of the idea as we propose. Lastly, Holmstorm’s 
paper did not discuss the participation problem as well as the rule of total liability for excessive harm. 
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II. Liability for Excessive Harm 
 
Analyzing the efficiency of alternative liability rules is a significant achievement 
of the economic analysis of law.10 We build on this analysis by repeating the familiar 
results and extending them to our novel rule.  We begin with this example.  
Example 1. An industrialist operates a factory whose smoke causes harm h to the 
neighbors. Without abatement, harm h equals 150.  Socially optimal abatement 
reduces harm by 50, so the socially optimal harm h* equals 100.  Abatement by 
50 costs 25.  
Abatement costs have two components. First, by taking precautions costing 15, 
the factory reduces the actual harm by 30. Second, by reducing production at a 
cost of 10 in foregone profits, the factory reduces the actual harm by 20. 
 
 Consider the incentives created for the industrialist by a rule of strict liability in 
Example 1. To implement a rule of strict liability, the authorities must be able to verify 
the actual harm caused by the factory. When implemented effectively, a rule of strict 
liability for actual harm causes the industrialist to choose between not abating and paying 
damages of 150, or abating at a cost of 25 and paying damages of 100. Since the later is 
cheaper, the industrialist will abate and total pollution will equal 100.11 These facts 
correspond to this familiar generalization: 
Proposition 1. Strict liability. Assume that m actors participate in an activity with 
unverifiable activity levels and unverifiable precautions that cause external harm 
H. Assume that individual harm hi is verifiable for all m participants. Strict 
liability of injurer i for the harm hi creates socially optimal incentives with respect 
to i’s precautions and activity level.  
 
Like all of our generalizations, Proposition 1 requires a concave total harm 
function H.  In contrast, all of our examples simplify by assuming an additive function -- 
total harm H equals the sum of individual harms. 
Instead of strict liability, now consider the consequences of a negligence rule in 
Example 1. To implement a negligence rule, the authorities must be able to verify the 
                                                 
10 See Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents (1970); John Brown, "Toward an Economic Theory of 
Liability," 2 J. Legal Studies 323-349 (1973); Stephen Shavell, "Strict Liability vs. Negligence" 9 J. Legal 
Studies 1 (1980). For a summary of conclusions, see Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 
(4th edition, 2003), chapter 8.    
11 This discussion implicitly assumes that transaction costs prevent the industrialist from bargaining with 
the neighbors and making a contract that creates optimal incentives.  We also assume that, unlike the 
industrialist, the neighbors can do nothing to reduce harm.  
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actual precaution taken by the factory. When implemented effectively, a negligence rule 
causes the industrialist to choose between not taking precaution and paying damages of 
30, or spending 15 on precaution and not paying damages. Since the later is cheaper, the 
industrialist will take precaution. A negligence rule, however, creates no incentive for the 
industrialist to restrain activity. Consequently, total pollution will equal 120. These facts 
correspond to this familiar generalization:  
Proposition 2. Negligence. Assume that m actors participate in an activity with 
verifiable precautions xip that cause external harm H. Assume that individual 
harm hi is verifiable for all m participants. Assume that law imposes a legal 
standard of care at the social optimum, xi*p.  If an injurer i’s case falls below the 
legal standard xi*p, then i is liable for actual harm that would have been avoided if 
his care had equaled the legal standard. Otherwise i is not liable.  i’s precautions 
will be efficient, and i’s activity level will be inefficient.  
   
Now we turn to the rule of liability for excessive harm.  In Example 1, “excessive 
harm” equals the difference between actual harm and optimal harm of 100. Liability for 
excessive harm causes polluter to choose between causing actual harm of 150 and paying 
damages of 50, or paying abatement costs of 25 and paying damages of 0. Since the later 
is cheaper, polluter will abate at the socially optimal level. Efficient abatement 
encompasses both efficient precaution and efficient activity level. Thus the rule of 
liability for excessive harm improves on the negligence rule with respect to incentives for 
injurer’s activity level.  This conclusion generalizes as follows: 
Proposition 3. Excessive harm. Assume that m actors participate in an activity 
with unverifiable activity levels and unverifiable precautions that cause verifiable 
external harm H. Assume the individual harm hi and the optimal harm hi* are 
verifiable.  Individual liability for excessive harm (hi-hi*) gives the injurer 
socially optimal incentives with respect to precaution and activity level. 
 
To understand why Proposition 3 is true, compare the difference in incentives 
between a rule of strict liability and a rule of liability for excessive harm. A rule of strict 
liability creates efficient incentives by making the injurer internalize the total social 
benefits and costs of precaution and activity level. Total social benefits and costs include 
marginal and infra-marginal benefits and costs. In contrast, a rule of liability for 
excessive harm creates efficient incentives by making the injurer internalize the marginal 
social benefits and costs of precaution and activity level. Consequently, the two rules 
differ in the allocation of infra-marginal costs.  
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To illustrate by Example 1, a rule of strict liability causes polluter to abate and 
pay 100 for actual harm, whereas a rule of liability for excessive harm causes polluter to 
abate and not pay for actual harm of 100. Under both rules, the injurer saves 25 by 
abating (same marginal incentives), but the first rule allocates optimal harm of 100 (infra-
marginal harm) to the injurer and the second rule allocates it to the victims.  
Later we will compare systematically the advantages and disadvantages of each 
type of liability rule. 
   
III. Total Liability 
 
The analysis in Part II assumes that the actual harm caused by the individual 
injurer is verifiable. In reality, however, victims often suffer from harm caused by many 
injurers whose individual contributions are unverifiable.  To illustrate, non-point source 
pollution (NPS) occurs when rainfall, snowmelt, or irrigation runs over land or through 
the ground, picks up pollutants, and deposits them into rivers, lakes, coastal waters, or 
ground water.  As the name suggests, verifying individual contributions of landowners to 
NPS pollution is difficult or impossible.  However, the total amount of pollution is often 
verifiable.12  
                                                 
12 See Nonpoint Source Pollution: The Nation’s Largest Water Quality Problem: EPA841-F-96-004A, 
available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/facts/point1.htm). See also Jon Cannon “Choices and 
Institutions in Watershed Management” 25 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 379, 388 (2000); Michael 
P. Vandenbergh “An Alternative to Ready, Fire, Aim: A New Framework to Link Environmental Targets 
in Environmental Law” 85 Ky. L.J. 803, 819-823 (1996-1997). Potential sources of NPS pollution are 
agriculture, forestry, grazing, septic systems, recreational boating, urban runoff, construction, etc. Today, 
NPS remains the largest source of water quality problems and the main reason that approximately 40 
percent of the surveyed rivers, lakes, and estuaries are not clean enough to meet basic uses such as fishing 
or swimming. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) does not have formal authority to regulate 
nonpoint source dischargers under the Clean Water Act, nor can most states regulate nonpoint sources 
under state statutes, instead relying on voluntary or incentive-based mechanisms. (Section 319 to the Clean 
Water Act requires that states attempt to control nonpoint source pollution; it falls short of requiring states 
to adopt a regulatory program).Consequently, federal involvement in nonpoint source control most 
frequently takes the form of nonpoint source assessment, management, and grant award programs, while 
the requirement from the states to control NPS does not achieve results: See Keith Keplinger “The 
Economics of Total Maximum Daily Loads” 43 Nat. Resources J. 1057, 1081 (2003); Esther Bartfeld 
“Point-Nonpoint Source Trading: Looking Beyond Potential Cost Savings” 23 Envtl. L. 43, 53-55 (1993).  
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Part III explains how to extend liability rules to situations where individual 
contributions are unverifiable and total harm is verifiable.  To begin, we modify the 
preceding example. 
Example 2. Each of m industrialists operates an identical factory whose smoke 
harms the neighbors. Each industrialist has to submit the factory’s design to 
officials. By examining the designs, officials can verify the total harm H* that all 
m factories ideally cause. Officials can also verify the total harm H that all m 
factories actually cause. However, officials cannot verify the actual harm h caused 
by any individual factory. Nor can officials verify any factory’s actual precaution 
and activity level.13
Without abating, the smoke from each factory will cause social harm h equal to 
150 and all m factories will cause total social harm H equal to 150m. Socially 
optimal abatement reduces harm by 50 from each factory.  So the optimal 
individual harm h* equals 100 and the optimal total harm H* equals100m.  
Abatement by 50 costs 25 for each factory.14  
 
 
Given the restrictions on verifiability in Example 2, officials must resort to 
liability based on total harm.  It is easy to think of many possible rules of liability for 
total harm. We will compare the incentive effects of the following three rules, which 
seem most important: 
i. strict total liability. Each of the m factories is liable for actual total pollution H.  
ii. total liability for excessive harm. Each of the m factories is liable for the 
amount that actual total pollution exceeds optimal total pollution: H-H*.  
iii. proportionate liability: Each of the m factories is liable for an equal proportion 
of total pollution: H/m. 
 
Under a rule of strict total liability, each factory that abates at a cost of 25 reduces 
its liability by 50. Consequently, each factory chooses to abate and reduce total pollution 
from 150m to 100m.  If the factories’ owners are unable to collude, they will not reduce 
pollution beyond the efficient level of 100m. Under a rule of strict total liability, 
however, each factory remains liable for 100m. In these circumstances, any factory that 
reduces pollution by $1 saves all polluters $m. Under such a rule of strict total liability 
                                                 
13 See e.g. Bartfeld, supra note 12, at 89-91 (“Nonpoint source loading and control choices are burdened 
with uncertainty. Uncertainty affects both the timing and concentration of nonpoint source pollutant loads 
and the types of control methods that are used to reduce nonpoint source pollution. … nonpoint source load 
levels are difficult to monitor, and are dependent on variable factors such as precipitation, erosion, and 
timing of chemical applications”).  
14 As in Example 1, we implicitly assume that the neighbors can do nothing to reduce harm, and transaction 
costs prevent the industrialist and the neighbors from solving the problem by private bargaining. 
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the m participants would gain together m times the value of any harm that they prevent.  
This fact gives the factories an incentive to collude and reduce pollution below the 
efficient level. This conclusion generalizes as follows: 
Proposition 4. Strict total liability. Assume that m actors participate in an activity 
with unverifiable activity levels, unverifiable precautions and unverifiable 
individual harm hi. Assume that actual total harm H is verifiable. If transaction 
costs prevent collusion among participants,15 then liability for total harm H gives 
each injurer socially optimal incentives with respect to precautions and activity 
level.16 If the participants can collude, then liability for total harm H gives the 
injurers incentives for excessive precaution and deficient activity. 
 
To illustrate, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) in response to a series of well-publicized 
hazardous waste problems in the 1970s.  The statute, commonly known as "Superfund," 
authorizes EPA to respond to environmental emergencies involving hazardous substances 
and contaminants, initiate investigations and clean-ups, and take enforcement actions. In 
order to achieve the remedial purposes of CERCLA, Congress created an exceptionally 
broad liability scheme under which people who own property containing hazardous 
substances can be held liable for enormous clean-up costs, even though they were not 
involved in any hazardous waste disposal activities.17 Under CERCLA people often pay 
for much more than the harms they created by their own acts or omissions.  CERCLA, 
consequently, creates a mechanism whose operation often resembles the rule of strict 
total liability. 18    
According to Proposition 4, if the parties under CERCLA cannot collaborate, the 
fact that they must sometimes pay for harms created by others does not distort their 
                                                 
15 We later discuss this assumption. 
16 See Devra L. Golbe and Lawrence J. White “Market Share Liability and its Alternatives" Center for Law 
and Business Working Paper #CLB-99-014 (September 17, 1999).  
17 Jeffrey A. Kodish “Restoring Inactive and Abandoned Mine Sites: A Guide to Managing Environmental 
Liabilities” 16 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 381, 384-385 (2001). 
18 CERCLA creates the following four categories of Potential Responsible Parties: 1) Current owners or 
operators of a facility; 2) owners or operators of a facility at the time of disposal of hazardous substances; 
3) persons who generated or arranged for the disposal or treatment of hazardous substances; and 4) 
transporters of the hazardous substances, if the transporter selected the disposal or treatment site.42 U.S.C. 
9607(a)(1)-(4) (1994). Except where the defendant can prove a reasonable basis for apportioning the harm, 
the courts adopted a broad rule that imposes strict joint and several liability, and retroactive liability for 
cleanup. In many cases, this scheme is considered to be too harsh on defendants. So it   was severely 
criticized. See, e.g., Lynda J. Oswald “New Directions in Joint and Several Liability under CERCLA?” 28 
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 299 (1995); John Copeland Nagle “CERCLA, Causation, and Responsibility” 78 Minn. 
L. Rev. 1493 (1994). 
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incentives with respect to precaution and activity level.  Indeed, if each party had paid for 
the entire harm created by all parties, and they were unable to collaborate, each one 
would have efficient incentives to abate.  With collusion, the liable parties would have 
abated above the efficient level. If collusion fails, however, some factories may prefer to 
shut down rather than pay for the harm caused by all factories.  We return to this point 
later when we analyze participation rates. 
Having discussed incentives under strict total liability, we next consider 
incentives under the rule of total liability for excessive harm. When this rule is applied to 
Example 2, each factory that abates at a cost of 25 reduces its liability by 50. Abating 
reduces total pollution from 150m to 100m. Consequently, each factory has an incentive 
to abate at the efficient level.  Under a rule of total liability for excessive harm, each 
factory’s liability falls to zero.  Consequently, each participant gains nothing if actual 
total harm H falls below optimal total harm H*.19  So they have no reason to collude or 
reduce pollution any further. The following proposition generalizes these conclusions: 
Proposition 5. Total liability for excessive harm. Assume that m actors participate 
in an activity with unverifiable activity levels, unverifiable precautions and 
unverifiable individual harm hi. Assume that actual total harm H and optimal total 
harm H* are verifiable.  Liability for excessive harm H-H* gives each injurer 
efficient incentives with respect to precautions and activity level. 
 
In spite of its advantages, this rule may seem unfair because individual injurers 
are threatened with liability for harm caused by others. When individual injurers are 
rational and make no errors, however, the incentives created by the rule cause actors to 
behave optimally, so actual total harm is not excessive and the threat of liability is not 
carried out.  
Now we turn to proportionate liability. When a rule of proportionate liability is 
applied to Example 2, each factory that abates at a cost of 25 reduces its liability by 50/m. 
If m is larger than 2 in Example 2, then abating costs each factory more than it saves in 
liability costs, so the factories will not abate. Unlike strict total liability and total liability 
                                                 
19 Even under a rule of total liability for excessive harm, errors or irrationalities might cause the parties to 
gain from collusion. We discuss errors and irrationalities later in the paper.  
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for excessive harm, a rule of proportionate liability creates deficient incentives for 
precaution and restraint of activity.20 This conclusion can be formalizes as follows. 
Proposition 6. Proportionate liability. Assume that m actors participate in an 
activity with unverifiable activity levels, unverifiable precautions and unverifiable 
individual harm hi. Assume that actual total harm H is verifiable. Also assume 
that transaction costs prevent collusion among participants. Liability for 
proportionate harm (H/m) gives each injurer deficient incentives with respect to 
precautions and activity level. 
 
  
The economic analysis of liability usually distinguishes between precaution and 
activity level. For example, a motorist decides how carefully to drive and how much to 
drive. Similarly, an industrialist decides how carefully to produce and how much to 
produce. Prior to deciding precaution and activity level, an actor must often decide 
whether or not to participate. For example, in order to participate in driving a person 
needs a car. Furthermore, car ownership is usually easier to verify than other factors 
affecting accidents such as how often or carefully one drives. Similarly, in order to 
participate in manufacturing a person needs a factory, and the construction of a factory is 
easier to verify than the care and level of its activities. Because of the difference in 
verifiability, this paper emphasizes the distinction between activity level and participation 
rate that previous literature mostly neglects. 
The incentives for participation are a decisive objection to the rule of strict total 
liability. This rule causes each of the m participants in the industry to pay damages of H, 
whereas the harm that each one causes is only hi.  To illustrate numerically by Example 
2, if m equals 5, then strict total liability causes each of the 5 participants in the industry 
to pay damage of 500, whereas the harm that each one causes is only 100.  A rule of strict 
total liability allocates much more infra-marginal cost to each injurer than he actually 
causes.  Consequently, the rule over-burdens participation in the industry. The result is 
too little investment and participation.21   
                                                 
20 Notice however, that when individual precautions and activity level is verifiable, a rule of proportionate 
liability may be optimal. See Ariel Porat and Alex Stein, Tort Liability under Uncertainty (Oxford 
University press, 2001) 101-59.  Also notice that, according to the Coase Theorem, perfect collusion would 
solve the problem of deficient precaution caused by this rule. 
21 If the rule of strict liability for total harm allows two factories to cut their total liability in half by 
merging, the rule will induce inefficient mergers by their desire to reduce liability.  
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For the rule of total liability for excessive harm, the analysis of participation 
reaches a different result. As we have explained, total liability for excessive harm gives 
each participant in an industry incentives to abate optimally, so total harm H equals H* 
and liability is zero. Instead of being zero, the harm that each one causes is hi. To 
illustrate by example 2, total liability for excessive harm causes each of the m 
participants in the industry to pay damage of 0, whereas the harm that each one causes is 
100. Under these circumstances, injurers cause somewhat more harm than they pay in 
damages, which results in somewhat too much participation.  
The rule of strict total liability grossly over-burdens participation, and the rule of 
total liability for excessive harm modestly under-burdens participation. In principle, 
however, a remedy exists in either case. Factory ownership, which requires initial 
investment, is usually easier to verify than other factors affecting pollution, such as how 
much a factory produces or abates. Because of the difference in verifiability, participation 
and activity level should be distinguished from each other. When participation is easy to 
observe, we advocate a participation tax to deter over-participation. 
Optimal incentives for participation require the injurer to internalize the cost that 
his participation imposes on others. The liability rule causes the participant to internalize 
some of these costs. Consequently, the participation tax should equal the social costs of 
participation that optimal liability does not impose. Under the rule of strict total liability, 
each participant has optimal incentives for precaution and activity level, so injurer i 
imposes social costs h*i on others. Under the rule of strict total liability, each participant 
faces liability H*. Thus the social costs of participation that optimal liability does not 
impose, which is the optimal participation tax, equals h*i–H*. This is typically a large 
negative number, so each participant receives a large participation subsidy. To illustrate 
by Example 2, the optimal participation subsidy under a rule of strict total liability equals 
100(m-1). Given 5 participants, the optimal participation subsidy equals 400.  
Similarly, under the rule of total liability for excessive harm, each participating 
injurer i imposes social costs h*i on others. Under the rule of total liability for excessive 
harm, each participating injurer faces liability 0. Thus the social costs of participation that 
optimal liability does not impose, which is the optimal participation tax, equals h*i. To 
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illustrate by Example 2, the optimal participation tax under a rule of total liability for 
excessive harm equals 100.  
The following generalization formalizes this result.  
Proposition 7: Optimal participation. Assume that n actors potentially participate 
in an activity. Assume that participants face liability l*i that induces socially 
optimal precaution and activity level. Assume that external harm H increases with 
more participation. Incentives for an optimal number of the n actors to participate 
are achieved if each actor i who participates pays a lump sum tax equal to the 
harm h*i caused by participating at optimal level of activity and precaution, minus 
the liability l*I.
 
The numbers in the preceding example suggest that the optimal participation 
subsidy under a rule of strict total liability is much larger than the optimal participation 
tax under a rule of total liability for excessive harm.  For this reason, the later is more 
practical and easier to implement than the former.22
Now we summarize our conclusions about participation. A rule of strict liability 
for individual harm causes each injurer to internalize the harm caused by his 
participation, as required for efficient participation. A participation tax is unnecessary. In 
contrast, a rule of strict total liability causes each injurer to internalize H*-h*i more harm 
than he actually causes. Consequently, inducing optimal participation under a rule of 
strict total liability requires a participation subsidy equal to H*-h*i, which can be a very 
large number.23 Without the participation subsidy, a rule of strict total liability causes 
deficient participation. In contrast, a rule of total liability for excessive harm provides 
incentives for injurers to meet the target H* for optimal harm, in which case their liability 
equals zero. When liability is zero, Proposition 7 indicates that optimal incentives for 
participation requires each injurer to pay lump sum tax equal to the harm h*i caused by 
participating at optimal precaution and activity level.24  
                                                 
22 If however the injurer is liable toward the state (and not toward the victims) who also gives the subsidy, 
strict total liability with participation subsidy and total liability for excessive harm with participation tax 
converge.   
23 Notice that the subsidy depends on optimal values H*-h*i, not on actual values H-hi. If actual values 
determine the subsidy, injurers will recognize that the subsidy will increase as the total harm H increases, 
which distorts their incentives. If ideal values determine the subsidy, then actual precautions and actual 
activity level does not affect the subsidy, so the existence of the subsidy does not change injurer’s 
incentives for precautions and activity level. 
24 Notice that the tax depends on optimal values h*i, not on actual values hi. See supra note. 
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We have shown that optimal participation can be achieved by a rule of total 
liability for excessive harm, combined with a participation tax equal to the harm that the 
injurer causes when his behavior is optimal. To illustrate by Example 2, assume that the 
environmental agency imposes a rule of total liability for excessive harm. In addition, the 
environmental agency examines the designs for factory i and determines that its pollution 
will cause harm of 100 when it abates optimally. To give the industrialist efficient 
incentives to build or not build the factory, the environmental agency should assess a 
participation tax of 100 for building the factory.  
We summarize the main conclusions of our paper in two tables. Table 1 shows the 
variables that must be verifiable in order to implement each of the liability rules. Table 2 
assumes that participation subsidy or tax is unavailable and compares the efficiency of 
the most important liability rules.  
Table 1: Verification Requirements 
Liability rule Total 
Harm 
H 
Ideal 
Harm 
H* 
actual 
individual 
harm h 
ideal 
individual 
harm h* 
actual 
individual 
precaution 
x 
ideal 
individual 
precaution 
x* 
total strict 
liabililty 
√      
total excessive 
harm 
√ √     
individual strict 
liability 
  √    
individual 
excessive harm 
  √ √   
negligence   √  √ √ 
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Table 2: Efficiency of Injurer’s Behavior  
Liability Rule  Precaution? Activity 
Level? 
Participation? (assumes no 
participation tax or subsidy) 
total strict 
liability 
collusion 
problem 
collusion 
problem 
far too low 
total excessive 
harm 
√ √ moderately too high 
individual 
strict liability 
√ √ √ 
individual 
excessive harm 
√ √  moderately too high 
Negligence √ too high moderately too high 
 
IV. Refining the Model 
 
Part IV refines the model in several ways, including the following topics: errors 
by authorities, search for the social optimum, irrational decision-making by actors, 
victims’ incentives, bankruptcy, synergy, and strategic behavior.  
 
Errors 
As explained, the rule of total liability for excessive harm creates incentives for 
efficient precaution and activity level. This result, however, requires the authorities to 
make no errors in setting the target H* and observing total harm H.25 This section 
explains what happens when the authorities make errors in assessing liability. 
One type of error consists in the authorities overestimating or underestimating the 
actual harm H. We call H+ε the harm observed by the authorities, when ε>0 implies an 
overestimation and ε<0 implies an underestimation. Under the rule of total liability for 
excessive harm, each injurer is liable when the total observed harm exceeds the social 
                                                 
25 The TMDL (total maximum daily load) rules, established under the Clean Water Act, § 303 by each 
state, are an example for setting the target H*. A TMDL is a calculation of the maximum amount of a 
pollutant that a waterbody can receive and still meet water quality standards, and an allocation of that 
amount to the pollutant's sources. See http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/intro.html; James Boyd “The New 
Face of the Clean Water Act: A Critical Review of the EPA’s New TMDL Rules” 11 Duke Env. L. & Pol’y 
F. 39 (2000) (providing an overview of TMDL’s program and considering the economic implications of 
movement toward a TMDL-driven regulatory system); Keplinger, supra note (offering an econmic analysis 
of the TMDL rules); Paula J. Lebowitz “Land Use, Land Abuse and Land Re-Use: A Framework for the 
Implementation of TMDLs for Nonpoint Source Polluted Waterbodies” 19 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 97 (2001) 
(providing guidance for developing implementation plans for TMDLs).   
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optimum, H+ε> H*, in which case liability equals the total observed excess H+ε- H*. 
Otherwise the injurer is not liable. 
Another type of error occurs when the authorities observe the social optimum H* 
with error ε, which we write H*+ε. The authorities over-estimate the socially optimal 
harm when ε>0, and the authorities under-estimate the socially optimal harm when ε<0. 
Under the rule of total liability for excessive harm, each injurer is liable when the total 
harm exceeds the observed social optimum, H> H*+ε, in which case liability equals the 
total observed excess H- H*-ε. Otherwise the injurer is not liable.  
With a rule of total liability for excessive harm, the situation where the authorities 
make an error in observing the target H* is mathematically identical to the situation 
where authorities make an error in observing the actual harm H. To be more precise, 
over-estimating actual harm H and attributing more harm to injurers than they actually 
cause is mathematically equivalent to under-estimating the socially optimal harm H* and 
setting the target too low. In either case, the error causes injurers whose behavior was 
socially optimal to be held liable by mistake.   
 When the kind of error that we are discussing occurs, it is often a random error. 
Random errors can be unbiased, in which case their expected value is zero: (E(ε)=0 ). As 
we will explain shortly, in the presence of random, unbiased errors in observing total 
harm H or setting ideal harm H*, the rule of total liability for excessive harm induces too 
little precaution and too much activity among risk-neutral injurers.  
Alternatively, random errors can be biased, in which case their expected value is 
not zero: ((E(ε)≠0). For errors biased towards lower liability (errors of under-estimation 
of actual harm H or over-estimation of socially optimal harm H*), we can show that the 
rule of total liability for excessive harm induces too little precaution and too much 
activity. Errors biased towards lower liability result in too much harm because injurers 
escape liability at a level of actual harm that is excessive. Having escaped liability, 
injurers have no incentive to reduce social harm any further. This conclusion is robust.    
Conversely, for errors biased towards higher liability (errors of over-estimation of 
actual harm H or under-estimation of socially optimal harm H*), the rule of total liability 
for excessive harm induces socially optimal precaution and activity level. To see why, 
consider the situation of an injurer whose behavior is socially optimal. By assumption the 
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authorities mistakenly set the target too low, or they mistakenly observe more total harm 
than actually occurs. Consequently, even though all of the injurers behave optimally, they 
still face liability. A small increase in precaution or a small decrease in activity level by 
any injurer will reduce his liability. The injurer thus internalizes the benefits and costs of 
reducing the total harm. Since his behavior is already socially optimal, a small increase in 
precaution or decrease in activity costs him more than the resulting reduction in liability. 
The injurer, consequently, prefers to continue behaving optimally with respect to 
precaution and activity level. (We discuss participation rate later.) Thus the error biased 
towards higher liability does not cause injurers who behave optimally to stop doing so. 
With respect to errors biased towards higher liability, however, the incentives for 
optimal behavior are not robust. In these circumstances, injurers have a strong incentive 
to collude with each other in order to reduce the level of actual harm H below the socially 
optimal level H*. By colluding to reduce actual harm H, the injurers can eliminate the 
excessive harm mistakenly observed by the authorities. Since each injurer is liable for the 
total excessive harm mistakenly observed by the authorities, the group of injurers saves a 
lot by escaping liability. In sum, an error by the authorities that increases liability under a 
rule of total liability for excessive harm provides socially optimal incentives to injurers 
who act strictly individually, but strong incentives also exist to collude and over-perform 
relative to the social optimum. 26  
To illustrate, assume that each of 5 polluters cause harm of 100, optimal harm H* 
is 500, and the authorities mistakenly set the target at 400. Under the rule of total liability 
for excessive harm observed by the authorities, if the polluters continue at the socially 
optimal level of pollution, each one pays 100 in mistaken liability and the total liability 
paid by all of them equals 500. By colluding and reducing pollution from 500 to 400, the 
5 polluters reduce their total liability from 500 to 0.  
Now we can explain why in the presence of random, unbiased errors in observing 
total harm H or setting ideal harm H*, the rule of total liability for excessive harm 
induces too little precaution and too much activity. Suppose that in the presence of 
random, unbiased errors the actor assumes, that liability would be too high at the 
                                                 
26Errors which induce higher liability could sometimes give incentives to actors who pay more than the 
excessive harm that they create to provide information about their harms, and switch accordingly from a 
rule of total liability for excessive harm to a rule of individual liability for excessive harm.   
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probability of .5 and too low at the probability of .5, while the expected magnitude of the 
error for high and low liability are equal. The actor also realizes that too low liability 
justifies too low precautions and too high activity, while too high liability justifies 
optimal precautions and optimal activity. Consequently, the actor who estimates the 
probabilities of too high and too low liability as equal, will take precautions below the 
optimal level, and his activity will be above the optimal level.    
Proposition 8 formulates these conclusions, which the appendix proves.  
Proposition 8. Total liability for excessive harm with random additive error. 
Assume that m risk-neutral actors participate in an activity with unverifiable 
activity levels and unverifiable precautions. Assume that actual total harm H and 
optimal total harm H* are verifiable with additive error ε. When H+ε>H*, each 
injurer is totally liable for H-H*+ε. Otherwise each injurer is not liable.  
(i). If the expected error is unbiased (E(ε)=0), then the injurer has incentives for 
too little precaution and too much activity.  
(ii). If the expected error is biased towards a legal standard that is too low 
(E(ε)<0), then the injurer has stronger incentives for too little precaution and too 
much activity. 
(iii). If the expected error is biased towards a legal standard that is too high 
(E(ε)>0), then the injurer has incentives to take optimal precaution and activity 
(but optimal incentives are vulnerable to collusion).  
 
Instead of charging people who increase social harm, why not subsidize people 
who reduce it? The incentive effects of liability for falling short of a target often resemble 
the incentive effects of subsidies for reaching a target. In the usual case, practical reasons 
favor liability over subsidies. This conclusion is especially true when discussing the rule 
of total liability for excessive harm. A rule that subsidized injurers for reducing total 
actual harm (H) below the socially optimal harm (H*) provides strong incentives for 
injurers to collude and reduce harm below the social optimum.  Therefore we do not 
advocate the adoption of such rule.   
We have discussed the consequences of random error on precaution and activity 
level. We also note briefly the consequences of random error on participation. Unbiased 
error does not change the expected payoffs for risk neutral injurers, so unbiased error 
does not change their incentives for participation. Error biased towards a legal standard 
that is too low increases the payoffs from participation. Consequently, participation will 
increase (assuming the participation tax remains constant). Conversely, error biased 
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towards a legal standard that is too high decreases the payoffs from participation. 
Consequently, participation will decrease (assuming the participation tax remains 
constant). 
We have explained that error biased towards a legal standard that is too low 
causes participation to increase, and error biased towards a legal standard that is too high 
causes participation to decrease. The social value of this increase or decrease in 
participation depends on the participation tax. When the participation tax is optimal, an 
error in assessing liability that causes participation to increase creates a problem of over-
participation, whereas an error that causes participation to decrease creates a problem of 
under-participation. In reality, the participation tax is likely to be nil. When the 
participation tax is nil, an error in assessing liability that causes participation to increase 
aggravates the problem of over-participation, whereas an error that causes participation to 
decrease ameliorates this problem.         
 
Search 
Proposition 8 concerns the consequences of errors by authorities on the incentives 
of others.  Another line of inquiry concerns the ability of authorities to learn and correct 
their errors.  To illustrate, consider the situation where the authorities have difficulty 
estimating the optimal social harm H*.  In these circumstances, the authorities might 
search for the optimum and converge towards it by iteration. The authorities might begin 
by allowing deliberately more harm than the social optimum. Thus the authorities set a 
target Ht well above H* in the first year.  As long as Ht is higher than the social optimum, 
all the firms would meet the target and pay no damages. In the next year, the authorities 
might decrease Ht. The authorities can repeat this process over several years.  As Ht 
decreases, eventually a point will be reached where further increases in abatement costs a 
firm more than liability, so the firms will fall short of the target and begin to pay 
damages. At that point, the authorities would know that Ht is marginally lower than H*, 
so they should increase Ht slightly and stop making changes. In brief, the authorities can 
proceed iteratively until the firms reveal that their marginal cost of abatement is at least 
as high as the marginal social cost of the harm from pollution. This is essentially the 
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same process in theoretical models of search for the Hand Rule standard of negligence or 
the optimal Pigouvian tax.27
After searching and finding the social optimum H*, the authorities should be alert 
to the possible emergence of new technologies that lower abatement costs and cause the 
optimal harm H* to decrease.  In response to such technical improvement, the authorities 
must decrease the target in order to keep it equal to the social optimum H*.  If they don’t 
do it, actors will have deficient incentives to use new technologies.  
    
Irrationality 
We have analyzed the consequences of simple, additive errors by authorities in 
observing actual or optimal harm.28 Now we turn to the consequences of errors or 
irrationality by some actors when deciding to abate. We will explain how rational actors 
respond to the presence of irrationality by some other actors. We will not discuss how to 
influence irrational actors, which would require a psychological theory of behavior that 
we have not developed in this paper.  
We can model irrationality as an error that causes actual behavior to deviate from 
rational behavior. We have explained that rational actors respond to a rule of total 
liability for excessive harm by causing total harm H to equal the target H*. We can 
analyze irrationality as a situation where actors respond to a rule of total liability for 
excessive harm by causing total harm H not to equal the target H*. From the viewpoint of 
rational actors, irrational behavior by others can be modeled as a random error ε such that 
H=H*+ε. Proposition 8 already describes the effects of such a random error on the 
behavior of rational actors. Thus we can reinterpret Proposition 8 as an account of the 
incentive effects that irrational actors impose on rational actors. 
                                                 
27 R. Cooter, L. Kornhauser, D. Lane, "Liability Rules, Limited Information, and the Role of Precedent” 10 
Bell Journal of Economics 366-373 (1979). 
28 Proposition 8 and the discussion leading up to it assumes the error in observation by authorities adds to, 
or subtracts from, the actual harm H or the optimal harm H*. Our conclusions would be quite different if 
the error multiplied the actual harm H or optimal harm H*. To illustrate multiplicative error, the authorities 
may underestimate actual harm by 10%, or the authorities may overestimate the socially optimal harm by 
15%. With a multiplicative error, the extent of liability under the rule off total liability for excessive harm 
can be written H(1+ε)-H*, or H-H*(1-ε). Multiplicative error affects marginal values, whereas additive 
error often does not affect marginal values. The effect of multiplicative errors on marginal values change 
incentives of injurers in situations where additive errors cause no change. 
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For example, assume that irrational over-performance by some actors tends to 
offset irrational under-performance by others, so the expected error from irrational actors 
is nil: E(ε)=0. In these circumstances, Proposition 8 asserts that rational actors will 
choose the socially efficient precaution and activity level. (The irrational actors are 
wasting resources by taking too much or too little precaution, but we offer no theory for 
how to influence their behavior and improve it.)  
In contrast, if irrational over-performance by some actors exceeds irrational 
under-performance by other actors, so that (E(ε)<0), then Proposition 8 asserts that 
rational actors will abate too little. Finally, if irrational under-performance by some actors 
exceeds irrational over-performance by other actors, so that (E(ε)>0), then Proposition 8 
asserts that rational actors who do not collude will abate efficiently, but rational actors 
have an incentive to collude.  
We have been discussing irrationality that takes the form of calculation errors by 
some actors. Under a rule of total liability for excessive harm, irrational actors who take 
too little precaution and too much activity reduce their own payoffs. That is why their 
behavior is irrational. However, they also reduce the payoffs of all the other injurers. 
Consequently, the other injurers have a strong incentive to help irrational actors to correct 
their errors, start behaving rationally, and abate more.  
Conversely, when an irrational actor takes too much precaution and too little 
activity, the rational actors benefit from this mistake and they have no incentive to help 
the irrational actors correct their errors, start behaving rationally, and abate less.29
 
 Victims Incentives 
We have been assuming that injurers can reduce social harm H and victims cannot 
reduce it. Now we relax the assumption that victims cannot influence the extent of social 
harm and we discuss briefly the incentives that alternative liability rules give victims. In 
general, when victims do not receive compensation, they internalize the benefits as well 
                                                 
29 We implicitly assume that the authorities do not respond to irrational actors by adjusting the target. If the 
legal target adjusts to irrational actors, the analysis becomes more complicated. 
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as the costs of their actions, so victims’ incentives are socially efficient.30 Consequently, 
if injurers are liable to the state and not liable to the victims, as with a pollution tax, then 
victim’s incentives are efficient.  
In terms of our notation, assume that injurers can reduce harm H by restraining 
their activity levels y and taking precaution x, and victims who suffer harm H can reduce 
it by acts z, so H=H(y,x,z). The acts z may encompass precaution and activity level.  If 
injurers are liable to the state and not to victims, then victims have incentives to set z 
equal to the social optimum z*.31  
Instead of being liable to the state, injurers may be liable to the victims.  If victims 
can increase their compensation by decreasing z, then they will have an incentive to set z 
below the social optimum z*. For example, victims will chose z lower than z* if their 
compensation equals the difference between actual harm H(y,x,z) and optimal harm 
H(y*,x*,z*).  
To avoid this problem, the state should calculate compensation by replacing the 
actual harm H(y,x,z) with the hypothetical harm that would result given the actual 
behavior of injurers and ideal behavior of victims H(y,x,z*). When liability follows this 
formula, victims receive compensation H(y,x,z*) - H(y*,x*,z*), which they cannot 
influence by their actual behavior z. Implementing this formula, unfortunately, may be 
difficult or impractical because of the difficulty in verifying H(y,x,z*).  
 
Risk of Bankruptcy 
 The possibility of bankruptcy blunts the injurer’s incentive effect of liability.   
Because of bankruptcy, the threat of liability is effective only to the extent of the injurer’s 
assets.  To illustrate, assume that a potential injurer must choose between an act that risks 
social harm of 50 and an act that risks social harm of 100. In order for the threat of 
liability for actual harm to provide an incentive to choose the first act instead of the 
second act, the injurer’s assets must exceed 50.  If the injurer’s assets equal 50, then the 
                                                 
30 Similarly, a rule of negligence in simple economic models induces non-negligent behavior by injurers, so 
victims face the same incentives as under a rule of no liability. This proposition is proved in many places, 
including Cooter and Ulen, supra note 1, Chapter 8. 
31 If liability equals H-H(y*,x*,z), and if z=z* when y=y* and x=x*, then (y,x,z)=(y*,x*,z*) is an 
equilibrium. 
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injurer will internalize the threat of liability up to 50, and externalize through bankruptcy 
the threat of liability exceeding 50.    
 Externalizing risk through bankruptcy is a problem for any liability rule. The 
problem exists for the rule of total liability for excessive harm and for all of the 
alternative rules.  There is, however, one way that bankruptcy affects the rule of total 
liability for excessive harm differently from a rule of individual liability.  Under the rule 
of total liability for excessive harm, each actor pays for the total excessive harm, 
regardless of the ability of other actors to pay.  Consequently, insolvency by one actor 
does not directly affect other actors’ liability. The only effect is indirect. If one actor 
knows he is under a substantial risk of insolvency, he may refrain from abating, since he 
would be unable to pay the excessive harm anyway. By refraining from abating, he will 
increase the total liability that other actors will have to pay. This indirect effect of one 
injurer’s bankruptcy on other injurers is absent for rule of individual liability when each 
injurer is liable for a separate harm that he creates. 
 Note however, that both a direct and indirect effects of insolvency of one actor 
exist under a rule of joint and several liability. When several injurers create one 
inseparable harm for which they are all jointly and severally liable, the injurers have 
contribution claims against each other.  In these circumstances, the insolvent injurer’s 
proportion of liability will be born by the solvent injurers.  In this respect, a rule of joint 
and several liability is more affected by insolvency than a rule of total liability for 
excessive harm.  
 The indirect effect of one injurer’s bankruptcy on others raises a general question 
for the rule of total liability for excessive harm: When one or more injurers inevitably 
fails to abate optimally, so total harm inevitably exceeds the target set by the authority, 
should the authority adjust the liability of the others? Such a failure could result from 
insolvency, irrationality, or criminality.  The optimal total harm (H*) could be adjusted to 
take into account the unexpected circumstances.  Thus the authority will treat inevitable 
failure to abate by one of the injurers in the same way that it treats natural harm that is 
outside of human control. In particular, if harm increases from unexpected circumstances, 
the target H* will be set higher than if the unexpected circumstances had not occurred.  
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Synergy  
 In our numerical examples, each participant creates separate harm that sum to the 
total harm for society. In reality, the harm created by one participant is not easily 
separated from the harm created by others. In these circumstances, the law says that 
several actors are “but-for causes” of one harm.  Although total harm to society may not 
be the sum of individual harms, the marginal harm caused by each actor may be 
calculable.  The marginal harm equals the change in total harm caused by a small change 
in an individual’s activity level or precaution. Our propositions assume that each actor 
can calculate his marginal contribution to the total harm.  Our propositions also assume 
that, as inputs increase, marginal benefits decrease and marginal costs increase. 
 The technical name for this condition is a “concave social welfare function.”32 By 
assuming that functions are concave, we assume the existence of a unique social 
optimum.  A concave function is analogous to a mountain with a single peak.  Individual 
actors are analogous to a climber in a fog.  Although the climber can only see for a few 
meters, he can eventually reach the peak by following the rule, “Always to up.”  
 We have explained that the truth of our propositions depend on the concavity of 
the underlying functions, not on the absence of synergies.  To illustrate, assume that if A 
produces output of 1 and no one else produces, then external harm equals -1.  Similarly, 
if B produces output of 1 and no one else produces, then total harm equals -1.  If A 
produces output of 1 and B produces output of 1, then total harm equals -3.  This fact 
illustrates synergy in harm.  These numbers, however, could be particular values of a 
continuous, concave function.33 If so, a rule of total liability for excessive harm will 
cause A and B to expand production until they reach the social optimum and then stop.    
 In contrast, a non-concave function create problems for decentralized decision 
making because more than one local optimum exists, and decision makers may find  a 
local optimum and  never find the global optimum. If the marginal values decrease at first 
and then start to increase, the function is not concave.  Consequently, individuals who 
                                                 
32A function f(x1,x2) is concave (weakly) if and only if, for all (x1,x2) the following conditions hold: 
f11(x1,x2)  <  0 
f22(x1,x2)  <  0 
f11(x1,x2) ⋅f22(x1,x2)  < f12(x1,x2)2.   
33 For example, the harm function might have the form –H=-A-B-A.2B.2, and the social welfare function 
might have the form 2(A+B)-H. 
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base their decision on marginal values may not find the optimum. A non-concave 
function is analogous to a mountain with several peaks, one of which is the “true peak” 
and the others are “false peaks.”  A climber who follows the rule, “Always to up,” may 
ascend a false peak and never find the true peak, just like decentralized decision makers 
may not find the optimum in a non-concave economy. 
    
Strategy 
Our propositions show that, under the rule of total liability for excessive harm, the 
social optimum is an individual optimum for non-strategic actors.  By “non-strategic” we 
mean that each actor does what is best for himself under the assumption that other actors 
will not change what they are doing. Under this assumption, actors take the behavior of 
others as given, just like firms in a model of perfect competition.   
This paper concerns situations where the authorities can verify total harm and 
cannot verify individual behavior.  With this distribution of information, the rule of total 
liability for excessive harm solves the problem of socially optimal incentives for non-
strategic actors.  If the authorities cannot verify individual behavior, then each participant 
is unlikely to be able to observe the individual behavior of other participants.  In other 
words, the circumstances where the authorities cannot verify individual harm are usually 
circumstances where the individuals cannot observe each others’ behavior.  When 
individuals cannot observe each others’ behavior, they naturally assume that other actors 
will not respond to what they do. When information is distributed as in our model, the 
most natural assumption is that individuals behave non-strategically.     
Although non-strategic behavior is most likely, we will consider some 
possibilities for strategic behavior.  The polar opposite of non-strategic behavior is 
perfect collusion.  Perfect collusion implies that all actors cooperate with each other to 
maximize their joint payoffs.  In our model, the aim of collusion is to minimize the total 
cost of liability and abatement for the parties.  Under the rule of total liability for 
excessive harm, the parties minimizes their total cost of liability and abatement by 
meeting the target H* and avoiding liability.  Thus, when the parties collude perfectly, 
the rule of total liability for excessive harm induces socially optimal results. Indeed, 
collusion has the advantage of enabling actors to help correct each others’ mistakes. This 
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fact suggests that the rule of total liability for excessive harm will prove robust and 
practical.  
There is a danger, however, that collusion over liability and abatement might 
prompt other harmful forms of collusion.  For example, collusion over abatement might 
lead to collusion over prices.  The tools or antitrust law are available to deal with this 
problem.  Another fear is that collusion over abatement will lead to political lobbying to 
set the target level of harm H* too high and keep it above the social optimum. The 
problem of setting standards and escaping political distortions is not special to our rule of 
liability.  It applies to all liability rules and regulations. An important topic for future 
research is to explore politically realistic means to set the target H* at the social 
optimum.  
Collusion involves cooperation.  Another topic to explore is forms of strategic 
behavior that do not involve cooperation.  Far too many possibilities exist to discuss them 
all.  To convey a sense of the problem, we will discuss two of them: the game of chicken 
and the practice of predatory pricing, which can result in a socially inefficient 
equilibrium.       
A sinister possibility is that an actor threatens to take too little precaution and too 
much activity in order to intimidate others. In other words, an actor threatens that he will 
impose liability on himself and everyone else unless they take steps to eliminate liability 
for everyone. This is a form of the game of “chicken”. To play chicken under the rule of 
total liability for excessive harm, an injurer refuses to abate efficiently in order to force 
other injurers to abate excessively.  
To illustrate by Example 2, assume that there are 5 identical actors, the optimal 
total harm H* is 500, the total actual harm H is 550, and the law imposes total liability for 
excessive harm. After 4 actors reduce their individual excessive harm to zero, the 5th 
actor considers whether to abate and reduce his excessive harm to zero as well. He may 
reason that if he does not abate, the other four actors will have very strong incentives to 
collude and increase abatement.  By colluding and eliminating excessive harm of 1, the 
other four actors can save themselves 4.   
We explained that the most natural assumption in our model is that the 5 actors 
cannot observe each others’ abatement efforts.  If no one knows how much each of the 
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others abates, then they cannot play chicken.  Even if they can somehow overcome the 
information obstacle and play chicken, this strategy has an inherent weakness:  The threat 
not to abate is incredible.  In economics, a threat is incredible if acting on a threat lowers 
the actor’s payoff. Incredible threats are usually ineffective because other people regard 
them as bluffs.  To be effective, people must believe that the party making the incredible 
threat is irrational.  Playing chicken thus requires overcoming an information obstacle 
and making others believe that you are irrational.  While this possibility may arise some 
time, it is too unlikely to justify rejecting the rule of total liability for excessive harm as a 
practical policy.34
Another strategic problem can arise when the injurers produce the same kind of 
goods and sell them in the same market.  In these circumstances, injurers are competitors 
and each one may gain an advantage by increasing the other’s costs. To illustrate, assume 
that the 5 actors discussed in Example 2 are competitors. Each actor realizes that by 
increasing harm above the target, he will increase the costs of his competitors.  A firm 
might take advantage of this fact to preclude new competitors from entering the market.  
Instead of optimal pollution, the firms pursue entry-limiting pollution.  
Similarly, a firm might use liability to engage in the pollution equivalent of 
predatory pricing.  Predatory pricing refers to a situation where a firm temporarily prices 
below cost in order to drive a competitor out of the market, and then raises the price 
above cost.  With a rule of total liability for excessive harm, a firm might temporarily 
create excessive harm in order to drive a competitor out of the market.  After the 
competitor withdraws from the market, the remaining firm returns to creating optimal 
harm and avoiding liability.  
The law has a long history of dealing with limit pricing and predatory pricing.  
The legal remedies are imperfect and the rule of total liability for excessive harm might 
sometimes aggravate these imperfections. Authorities might try to tailor liability to 
                                                 
34 Notice that without collusion among the other four actors the first actor would not play “chicken”. To 
illustrate, suppose that in the example in the text, the first actor does not abate and each of the other actors 
believe that his refusal to abate is credible. Nevertheless, after the other actors reduced their excessive harm 
to zero, none of them will abate, because by definition, each of the actors’ costs of additional abatement are 
higher than the harm they could reduce by additional abatement. This proposition is valid with respect to 
each and every actor, regardless of how the other actors behave.    
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problems of imperfect competition.35 Although these strategic problems are real, we do 
not consider them to be decisive in deciding whether or not to adopt our rule. One reason 
why these strategic problems are not decisive is that firms emitting the same pollutant 
often do not compete in product markets. When firms do not compete in product markets, 
the rule of total liability for excessive harm has no bearing on limit pricing or predatory 
pricing. 36 Another reason is that when several injurers participate in the market, limit 
pricing or predatory pricing sometimes requires collusion among them.  Besides the 
information obstacle to this kind of collusion, it is also illegal. The authorities already 
have legal remedies for limit pricing and predatory pricing.  
 
V. Examples and Applications 
 
To show that it is practical, we will describe some real and hypothetical situations 
where the rule of total liability for excessive harm could be applied to great advantage. 
 
Fish Cages at Eilat 
 The gulf of Eilat in the Red Sea attracts many tourists to its coral reefs.  As of 
August 2004, 70% of the coral reef in the Gulf of Eilat is dead or seriously damaged. The 
deterioration in the coral reef is attributed to the decline in the quality of water.   Between 
1997 and 2002, measurements of water quality have detected a rise in the concentration 
of nitrates, a decline in the pH of the water close to shore, the growth of sea-weed, and  
                                                 
35 The authorities might set different targets for different firms in order to take into account the risk of a big 
firm trying to defeat a small firm by increasing harms. To illustrate by Example 2, if the authorities detect a 
predatory behavior of one of the firms, it can set for the big firm a target of 125m, and 100m for the others, 
until the big firm stops behaving strategically. This possibility depends of course on the ability of the 
authority to observe such behaviors, which is not always easy. 
 
36 However, even if the firms do not compete in the products market, the firms could still compete over the 
“right” to pollute. Thus, if the environmental protection agency allows a certain amount of pollution in a 
specific area, some polluters could find it beneficial to increase pollution in order to drive out of the area 
other polluters. If the former polluters succeed in their efforts, fewer polluters will later share the “right” to 
pollute. This concern disappears, however, if the environmental protection agency adapts H* to encompass 
the number of polluters acting in the area.      
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rise in the percentage of the organic substance in the bottom of the sea. Biochemical 
Oxygen Demand (BOD) in the water has reached the lowest level ever detected.  
 The decline in water quality is primarily due to fish cages. Approximately 2,500 
ton of fish (primarily Sea Bream) are grown each year in the cages.  On September 9, 
2004 a group of international scientists (IET) published a report that concluded that the 
fish cages are responsible for over 80% of the non-natural nitrates in the Gulf. In addition 
to fish cages, other causes for decline in the quality of the water include discharge of 
sewage into the Gulf; the marina; oil leakages from boats, heavy metals, toxic organic 
substances, detergents, and TBT (a substance in the color that coats the bottom of boats); 
sand; and divers. However, the harm caused by all of these additional elements have been 
substantially reduces in recent years, and together they account for less than 20%.   
 The fish cages are operated by two main companies: Ardag, Ltd. and Dag-Suf, 
Ltd.  The two companies operated on a temporary license that has expired, and now they 
continue to operate without proper licenses. In an attempt to close them, the Municipality 
of Eilat tried to stop their supply water, electricity, and telephone lines.  In response, the 
two companies sued the municipality in 2003, alleging that the municipality has no 
jurisdiction over their operations in the sea.  The district court of Be'er-Sheve rejected 
this claim and concluded that the municipality’s actions were legal.  Even so, the fish 
cages are still operating in the Gulf. 
 Consider how a liability rule might solve the problem.  In this case, the total harm 
caused by the two companies is verifiable, whereas the individual contributions are 
unverifiable. Consequently, a rule of individual liability is impractical, whereas a rule of 
total liability is practical.  A rule of total liability for excessive harm requires the 
authorities to set a target for total pollution.  The authorities could start with a modest 
target and then raise it each year.  The companies operating the fish cages would respond 
by increasing precaution or reducing activity level to avoid liability. Perhaps the 
companies would shift some of their operations from the sea to tanks or ponds on land.   
The legal target should continue to increase until the two companies prefer to pay for 
liability rather than reducing pollution any further, or until the companies close.   
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Industrial Pollution of the Kishon River 
 The final 7 kilometers of the Kishon River, where it flows  into the Mediterranean 
Sea at Haifa, have been polluted by sewage runoff and industrial waste, especially from 
chemical plants, for over half a century.  In 1994, the "Kishon River Authority" assumed 
responsibility to restore the river.  Although some progress has been achieved, the Kishon 
River is still sufficiently polluted to prohibit fishing, swimming, or other water-sport 
activities in the river.   These facts have especially caught the attention of the Israeli 
public because of the fate of an elite army squad.  The squad trained in the polluted water 
and now has at least 88 documented cases of malignant tumors in its men.  The incidence 
of cancer in this army unit far exceeds base rates.  In this politicized atmosphere, the 
Kishon River Authority has committed to full ecological rehabilitation of the river by 
2010. 
  According to the Israeli Ministry of Environment (2001) there are 8 main 
industrial sources of pollution, consisting of 3 petrochemical plants (Haifa refineries, 
Carmel Ulpinim, Gadiv) and 5 fertilizer plants (Haifa Chemicals, Dshanim, Gadot 
Biochemistry, and Frutarom).   The industrial polluters discharge a variety of pollutants, 
especially the metals chromium, copper, mercury, and zinc.  Measuring the extent of 
these metals in the river are easily measured, although the individual contributions of 
polluters upstream from the place of measurement are difficult to determine.  In these 
circumstances, the Kishon River Authority could pursue its goals by applying the 
principle of total liability for excessive harm.  For each metal, the small number of firms 
that discharge it would be totally liable for concentrations in the river that exceed the 
Kishon River Authority’s targets.  
      
Non-point source pollution  
 The Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) is the maximum amount of a pollutant 
that a water body can receive from all sources and still meet water quality standards.  
Section 303(d) of the U.S. Clean Water Act provides the EPA with the power to set 
TMDLs. The calculation must include a margin of safety to ensure that the water can be 
used for the purposes designated by the State. The calculation must also account for 
seasonal variation in water quality. Section 319 of the 1987 Act requires states to identify 
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water bodies in which control of non-point source polluters is necessary, and to establish 
management programs for these water bodies.   
 The rule of total liability for excessive harm is practical when a small number of 
identifiable sources supply most of a particular pollutant. The rule is especially useful for 
non-point source pollution, such as runoff from agricultural and urban areas. While total 
NPS pollution is measurable, attribution of the individual contribution to NPS is seldom 
measurable. Where pollution from several sources eventually finds its way into a body of 
water, each polluter could be held liable for total harm caused by an excess of pollution 
above the TMDL. TMDLs provide targets suitable for a rule of total liability for 
excessive harm.  Implementing liability involves attaching dollar values to harm from 
exceeding the TMDL for each pollutant.     
 Agricultural runoff is one form of non-point source pollution. For example, 
California's Regional Quality Control Board established TMDLs for water pollution 
caused by framers' irrigation tail water in Imperial Valley, California. The farmers were 
asked to install measures to control sediment in their runoff. The program helps 
identifying best management practices (BMPs) that can slow the flow of irrigation water 
and allow sediments to settle out before reaching the body of water.37  
 As another example, phosphorus runs off of farms into the Florida Everglades.  The 
“Agricultural Privilege Tax” imposes a property tax increase on all farmers if basin-wide 
reductions in nutrient load into the Everglades do not meet statutory targets over time.  
Specifically, the statute requires the tax to begin at $24.89 per acre in 1996 and increase 
every four years to a maximum of $35 per acre from 2006 through 2014.  However, the 
farmers in the designated area can escape the tax increase by exceeding an overall 25 
percent basin-wide phosphorus reduction goal. Beginning in 1995-1996, phosphorus 
loadings will be compared to a baseline derived from loadings recorded from 1979-
1988.38
                                                 
37An account of these facts is available in March 2005 on the internet at 
http://www.epa.gov/region9/water/nonpoint/nps-tmdl.pdf.  
38 See US Environmental Protection Agency, Non-point Source News-Notes, dated 10/96 and available 
online on the internet in 2005 at 
http://notes.tetratech-ffx.com/newsnotes.nsf/0/bff4df21f49ed6de8525666a0051923f?OpenDocument. We 
wish to thank Sandra Hoffman for this example and reference. 
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 Besides agricultural runoff, non-point source pollution occurs in urban areas from 
street runoff into storm sewers. Where storm sewers and sanitary sewers are combined, 
the runoff and the raw sewage pass into receiving waters when treatment systems become 
overloaded as a result of storms or thaws. 
 
 
To show the scope of application of our rule, we now turn to some hypothetical 
examples.    
 
Hypothetical Example of pollution by buses. A city has three large bus 
companies. The fleet of buses varies in age, design, and state of repair. City 
officials can determine with reasonable accuracy the amount of total pollution 
caused by buses, but not the amount of pollution caused by each of the three 
companies. Before remedial action, the buses emit 100 units of pollution. The 
City sets a target of reducing total pollution to 90 units.39
  
To achieve the City’s goal in this example, the City could impose a rule of total 
liability for excessive harm, which would hold each of the three bus companies liable for 
actual pollution exceeding the target of 90 units. This rule would give each of the three 
companies a strong incentive to reduce its own pollution and to collaborate with the other 
companies to help them reduce their pollution. The great advantage of the rule is that it 
creates efficient incentives for the three companies without requiring the City officials to 
inspect buses or enforce rules on their operation.  
Now we turn to an example of hospital performance. 
Hypothetical Example of Hospital Services. When Hospital A diagnoses 
melanoma, it refers the patient to Hospital B for treatment. The rate of death 
among patients diagnosed in hospital A and treated in hospital B is 20%.  Experts 
using statistics determine that when diagnosis and treatment follow the best 
medical practices, the rate of death in the relevant population is 15%. The 5% 
excess in deaths e could result from tardy diagnosis by hospital A or deficient 
treatment by hospital B.  
                                                 
39  An analogous situation was discussed in the case of Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Division 495 F.2d 213 
(1974): defendants were several corporations that operated manufacturing plants in the United States, near 
the Canadian border. Plaintiffs were Canadian residents who filed a complaint in district court alleging that 
the combined, though non-conspiratorial, pollution caused by defendants' plants created a nuisance. The 
court held that the defendants may be jointly and severally liable as the nuisance produced a single, 
indivisible injury, where the division of liability among defendants was unascertainable. See also H. 
Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Company et al. 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952). The plaintiff alleged 
that each of the two defendants, one a saltwater disposal firm and the other an oil company, had 
independently polluted the plaintiff's lake, killing fish. The defendants were held jointly and severally 
liable.   
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In this example, the hospital authority can impose a rule of total liability for 
excessive harm on hospital A and hospital B. Under such a rule, if the two hospitals 
continue to have a death rate of 20% and the optimal rate remains 15%, then each will 
pay for the excessive harm of 5%. Consequently, each hospital will have a strong 
incentive, individually and cooperatively, to adopt optimal practices and lower the death 
rate to 15%. Once the death rate falls to the optimum, the hospitals are no longer liable 
for the death of melanoma patients. (Note that in the case of hospitals, a participation tax 
is unnecessary to avoid excessive participation under the rule of total liability for 
excessive harm.)40  
A potential problem with this liability rule is that the two hospitals might attempt 
to improve their performance by refusing to take patients whose survival prospects are 
below average. For example, hospital A might not admit patients who delay too long and 
come to the hospital with an advanced stage of melanoma. This is the same problem of 
adverse selection that afflicts private medical insurance markets. This problem 
diminishes or disappears in so far as hospitals must accept all patients in need of care.  
Next we turn to accidents.  
Hypothetical Example of Exploding Bottles. Company A supplies bottles to 
Company B who fills them with soda. Defective bottles supplied by A or 
defective filling of bottles by B can cause explosions that injure consumers.  
  
In this example, the consumer protection agency could apply the rule of total 
liability for excessive harm. Under such a rule, the agency would collect statistics on the 
frequency of injuries to consumer of soda and determine the expected rate of injury for 
companies following the best practices. If the actual rate for company A and B exceeded 
                                                 
40 In our earlier analysis of pollution, we explained that when factories that abate optimally face no liability, 
a participation tax can make them internalize the social cost of their participating in the market. This 
problem of participation, however, does not arise in the preceding case of hospitals. When hospitals 
diagnose and cure melanoma at the optimal rate, their participation in the medical market does not cause 
the remaining melanoma deaths. Unlike polluting factories, there is no need for a participation tax on 
hospitals. If hospitals are held liable for harm that they did not cause, their profitability will fall, which will 
discourage participation. The rule of total liability for excessive harm avoids this problem by exempting 
hospitals that perform optimally from liability. 
Sometimes there is a difference between optimal practices, and over-optimal practices, that can reduce 
harm even below the optimal level of harm. Still, one cannot argue that hospitals “caused” social harm 
when they took optimal practices (instead of over-optimal practices). To understand why, apply the “but 
for” causation test to hospital which takes the optimal level of care, and ask what would have been the 
social harm but for the participation of the hospital.  
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the ideal rate, then the consumer protection agency would collect a fine from both 
companies. Thus the two firms would have a strong incentive to work together to reduce 
defects to the ideal level.    
The next example that we give relates to cases where human behavior and nature 
inseparably combine to inflict injuries on many people. 
Hypothetical Example of Radiation.41 Several factories begin operating and emit 
carcinogenic radiation.  In the area affected by radiation, the incidence of cancer 
increases by 25%, from 80 to 100 people each year.  Distinguishing between the 
20 victims of industry and the 100 victims of nature is impossible.42
 
Assume that the original rate of harm—80 victims—is the social optimum.  
Applying the rule of total liability for excessive harm to this example would make each 
factory liability for the harm suffered by all 20 cancer victims. The rule creates efficient 
incentives for the factories to eliminate deaths from industrial radiation. Damages could 
be paid to the state or to the 100 victims of cancer.  
We conclude this section with an example of how the rule of total liability for 
excessive harm can help solve the “Tragedy of the Common.”  
Hypothetical Example of the “Tragedy of the Commons”.  Three municipalities 
around a lake regulate fishing by its citizens. The Lake Authority is concerned  
that the municipalities will allow too much fishing and deplete the stock of fish.  
Monitoring each municipality is costly.  
     
The three municipalities in this example potentially face a “tragedy of the 
commons.” All of them benefit as a group from preserving the optimal stock of fish.  
However, each municipality benefits as an individual from fishing more than its share 
and free-riding on the restraint of the others.  To solve the problem, the Lake Authority 
can adopt this rule of total liability for excessive harm:  When the stock of fish falls 
below a certain target, each of the three municipalities should pay a tax. The tax rate 
should reflect the social harm caused by the shortfall in the stock of fish.  The 
municipalities should support this policy by the Lake Authority because it averts the 
tragedy of the commons at low administrative costs. 
                                                 
41See Porat & Stein, supra note, at p. 70. 
42 For a well-known case belonging to this category of cases and in which a settlement was reached, see In 
re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d, 818 F. 2d 145 (2d 
Cir. 1987). 
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We have explained that the municipalities should support the policy of total 
liability for excessive harm imposed on them by the Lake Authority. For the same reason, 
if there were no Lake Authority, the municipalities should reach this same arrangement 
by contract.  The contract would specify that each of them must pay for excessive total 
harm, and the payment should go to a third party such as a charity.   
     
VI. Conclusion  
 
In the last century, the rule of strict liability for consumer product injuries 
displaced the rule of negligence.  Problems of proof compelled the change. For certain 
kinds of harm, we believe the same consideration will eventually compel replacing 
individual liability with the rule of total liability for excessive harm. As we have 
explained, the rule is practical under three conditions:  (i) total harm is verifiable, (ii) 
optimal total harm is calculable, and (iii) the number of injurers is not too large.  When 
these conditions are met and individualized liability, taxes, fines, or transferable rights 
are too costly to administer, we recommend adopting the rule of total liability for 
excessive harm.  
Moralists might reject this recommendation because it imposes “collective 
punishment.”  On the path to equilibrium, actors could find themselves paying for harms 
caused by others, and errors or strategic behavior might continue this result in 
equilibrium.  Where actors pay for harms caused by others, however, the excessive harm 
caused by everyone is usually less than the individual harm caused by each actor. The 
rule of total liability for excessive harm, consequently, will usually result in lower 
damages than the rule of strict liability for individual harm.   When each actor pays less 
than the individual harm that he caused, he has little reason to complain of “collective 
punishment.” And if errors or strategic behavior are not too disruptive, once the system 
reaches equilibrium, no one should pay for the harm caused by another.43
                                                 
43 The argument for the rule’s fairness resembles the utilitarian justification of an effective deterrent: An 
“effective” deterrent is fair because it does not have to be used. Utilitarian and deontological traditions 
disagree about whether a very harsh penalty that perfectly deters and never require use should be praised 
for its good consequences or condemned for its excessive threat. For a recent contribution to this debate 
that favors the utilitarian tradition, see L. Kaplow and S. Shavell, "Fairness versus Welfare" 114 Harvard 
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The fact that the total liability for excessive harm rule creates socially optimal 
incentives should make it attractive to people who want to promote the public interest. 
The fact that injurer’s escape bureaucratic regulation and each injurer’s liability equals 
zero in equilibrium should make the rule more attractive to injurers than most 
alternatives.  In order for people to be attracted to the rule, however, they must 
understand its consequences.  As this paper shows, some consequences are counter-
intuitive.  The difficulty that most people have in understanding the effects of the rule of 
total liability for excessive harm constitutes the largest obstacle to its acceptance.  
  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
L. Rev. 961-1388 (2001). For environmental law application, see Shi-Ling Hsu “Fairness Versus Efficiency 
in Environmental Law” 31 Ecology L.Q. 303 (2004) (arguing for more economics and more efficiency-
thinking in environmental law).  
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 Mathematical Appendix 
Definitions 
n=number of potential participants 
m=number of actual participants, where m<n. 
ki=actor i’s fixed cost of participating 
Km= total fixed cost of participating by actors 1,2,…,m. 
xij = input j by actor i  
xi = vector of inputs by actor i, one of which is precaution xi∏  
x= vector of inputs by all actors 1, 2,…n  
pj= price of input j 
p= vector of prices of inputs 
yi= output by actor i (also called “activity level”) 
y= vector  of outputs by all actors 
qi= price of i’s output 
q= vector of market prices of outputs 
hi= harm caused by actor i 
H=total social harm 
H)i(=total harm that would result if actor i were not participating  
li=i’s liability 
ti=i’s lump sum participation tax  
V=social welfare 
* indicates a socially optimal value. 
 
Functions          
Km= k1+ k2+…+km=total cost of participating by m actors 
yi= yi(xi)  production function of actor i 
0= yi=xi for i>m+1 no activity or precaution by non-participants 
H=H(y;x) total harm 
H)i(=H(y;x) - H(y1,y2,…,yi-1,0,,yi+1,…,ym;x1, x2,… xi-1,0,xi+1,…,xm)  
hi=H- H)i(
V=qy - px – H(y, x) – Km  social welfare function. 
 
Assume that potential participants 1,2,…,n are uniquely arranged in order from 
highest to lowest contributors to social welfare.  Consequently, when all actors who 
participate do so at the socially optimal inputs, social welfare falls more when actor i 
stops participating than when actor i+1 stops participating, for all i.  
 
Social optimum 
Maximize social welfare: 
max      qy - px – H(y;x) – Km     
xym 
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subject to 
yi= yi(xi) all i 
0= yi=xi for i>m+1. 
 
 
First order conditions for optimal activity level and precaution by all m participants:  
qi – Hyi + λ      < 0           optimal activity level yi* for i=1,2,..,m. 
-pj - Hxij - λ yixij  < 0         optimal precaution xij* for i=1,2,..,m and j=1,2,..,m. 
Combining the preceding conditions yields 
qiyxij -pj – Hyiyixij - Hxij < 0    for all i,j                                                              (1)                   
 
Conditions for number of participants m to be optimal: 
qiyi* - pxi* – h*i – ki > 0  for i=1,2,..,m                                                  (2) 
                                    < 0   for i=m+1, m+2,…,n. 
 
Individual Rationality 
Assume that each actor i responds to prices, liability, and taxes, but does not 
anticipate how his behavior might influence the behavior of others (zero conjectural 
variations). i maximizes his profits: 
max qiyi - pxi – li - ti
xiyi
subject to 
yi= yi(xi). 
First order conditions: 
qi – liyi + λi     < 0               individually optimal activity level yi+
-pxij - lixijj  - λiyxij  < 0           individually optimal precaution xij+ for all j 
Combining conditions yields 
qiyxij -pxij – liyiyxij - lixij  < 0.                   (1’) 
 
Condition for i’s participation (non-negative average net revenues): 
qiyi+ - pxi+ – li+ - ti – ki > 0.                   (2’). 
 
Propositions – proofs are interpretations of the conditions for 
social and individual optima 
We prove the efficiency or inefficiency of equilibria that exist, but we do not 
prove the existence of equilibria. The propositions are interpretations of the conditions 
for social and individual optimization.  
 
Proposition 1. Strict liability. Assume that m actors participate in an activity with 
unverifiable activity levels and unverifiable precautions that cause external harm H.  
Assume that individual harm hi is verifiable for all m participants.  Strict liability of 
injurer i for the harm hi creates socially optimal incentives with respect to i’s precaution 
and activity level.   
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Proof:  
By assumption, i’s liability equals the harm i caused, li=hi.  By Definition, li= H- 
H)i(. 
 Equation (1`) for individual rationality thus reduces to  the condition for socially 
optimal precaution and activity level: qiyxij -pj – Hyiyixij - Hxij < 0. 
 
Proposition 2. Negligence. Assume that m actors participate in an activity with 
verifiable precautions xip that cause external harm H. Assume that individual 
harm hi is verifiable for all m participants. Assume that law imposes a legal 
standard of care at the social optimum, xi*p.  If an injurer’s case falls below the 
legal standard xi*p, then injurer is liable for actual harm that would have been 
avoided if his care had equaled the legal standard.  Otherwise injurer is not liable.  
i’s precautions will be efficient, and i’s activity level will be inefficient.  
 
Proof: 
1. Assume that actual precaution xi∏ is epsilon below the legal standard,  which is 
the social optimum by assumption.  Consequently, the individual is liable for the 
actual harm that he causes.  His costs are the same as under strict liability, so, by 
Proposition 1, costs are minimized by setting precaution and activity level at the 
social optimum, and thus he increases his precaution by epsilon and it equals the  
social optimum. 
2. When precaution equals the social optimum, liability falls to zero.  Now 
equation (1`) for individual rationality reduces to the following for all variables 
except precaution: 
qiyxij -pj  < 0 for all inputs j except those indicating precaution. 
This condition does not coincide with the social optimum except by chance.  
 
Proposition 3. Excessive harm. Assume that m actors participate in an activity 
with unverifiable activity levels and unverifiable precautions that cause verifiable 
external harm H. Assume the individual harm hi and the optimal harm hi* are 
verifiable.  Individual liability for excessive harm (hi-hi*) gives the injurer 
socially optimal incentives with respect to his precaution and activity level. 
 
Proof:   
1.  Assume that actual harm hi is above the legal standard hi*.  Consequently, 
injurer’s liability for excessive harm (hi-hi*) is identical to injurer’s liability under 
a rule of strict liability except for the constant hi*.  First order conditions are 
invariant with respect to changing the maximand by a constant.  Consequently, 
the proof for Proposition 1 implies that injurer will lower hi to hi*. 
2. Assume that actual harm hi is below the legal standard hi*.  Consequently, the 
injurer’s liability is zero.  Therefore the injurer will lower his costs by reducing 
precaution and increasing the activity level until he raises hi to hi*. 
 
Proposition 4. Strict total liability.  Assume that m actors participate in an activity 
with unverifiable activity levels and unverifiable precautions that cause verifiable 
external harm H. Assume that transaction costs prevent collusion among 
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participants.  Liability for total harm H gives each participant socially optimal 
incentives with respect to precautions and activity level.  
 
Proof:  By assumption, individual i’s liability equals total harm: li=H.  
Consequently, condition (1) for socially optimal activity level and precaution is 
the same as condition (1`) for individual rationality. 
  
Proposition 5. Total liability for excessive harm. Assume that m actors participate 
in an activity with unverifiable activity levels and unverifiable precautions.  
Assume that actual total harm H and optimal total harm H* are verifiable.  
Liability for excessive harm H-H* gives each injurer efficient incentives with 
respect to precautions and activity level. 
 
Proof:   
1. Assume that actual harm H is above the legal standard H*.  Consequently, 
injurer’s liability for excessive harm (H-H*) is identical to injurer’s liability under 
a rule of strict total liability except for the constant H*.  First order conditions are 
invariant with respect to changing the maximand by a constant.  Consequently, 
the proof for Proposition 1 also proves that injurer will increase his payoff by 
decreasing activity and increasing precaution until H equals H*. 
2. Assume that actual harm H is below the legal standard H*.  Consequently, the 
injurer’s liability is zero.  Therefore the injurer will increase his payoff by 
increasing activity and decreasing precaution until H equals H*.   
  
Proposition 6.  Proportionate liability. Assume that m actors participate in an 
activity with unverifiable activity levels and unverifiable precautions that cause 
verifiable external harm H. Assume that transaction costs prevent collusion 
among participants.   Liability for proportionate harm (H/m) gives each injurer 
deficient incentives with respect to precautions and activity level. 
Proof: 
1. The condition (1) for social optimal activity level  and precaution reduces is  
qiyxij -pj – Hiyiyxij - Hixij < 0. 
2. The assumption that liability li equals H/m implies that equation (1`) for 
individual rationality reduces to  qiyxij -pxij – (Hiyiyxij - Hixij )/m  <   0. 
3. Thus individual rationality results in sub-optimal precaution and activity level 
except by chance. 
Proposition 7:  Optimal participation. Assume that n actors potentially 
participate in an activity.  Assume that participants face liability that 
induces socially optimal precaution and activity level.  Assume that 
external harm H increases with more participation. Incentives for an 
optimal number of the n actors to participate are achieved if each actor i 
who participates pays a lump sum tax equal to the harm h*i caused by 
participating at optimal level of activity and precaution minus the liability 
l*i.  
Proof:   
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1. Incentives for participation are socially optimal when equal (2`) is identical to 
the condition for individual participation (2).  Setting these equations equal to 
each other yields qiyi* - pxi* – h*i – ki = qiyi+ - pxi+ – li+ - ti – ki.   
2. By assumption, injurers face liability that induces socially optimal precaution 
and activity level, so xi*= xi+ and yi*= yi+.   
3. Substituting “2” into “1” yields ti =h*i-li. 
 
Proposition 8. Total liability for excessive harm with random additive 
error. Assume that m risk-neutral actors participate in an activity with 
unverifiable activity levels and unverifiable precautions. Assume that 
actual total harm H and optimal total harm H* are verifiable with additive 
error ε. When H+ε>H*, each injurer is totally liable for H-H*+ε.  
Otherwise each injurer is not liable.   
(i).  If the expected error is unbiased (E(ε)=0), then the injurer has socially 
efficient incentives with respect to precautions and activity level.   
(ii).  If the expected error is biased towards a legal standard that is too low 
(E(ε)<0), then the injurer has incentives for too little precaution and too 
much activity. 
(iii).  If the expected error is biased towards a legal standard that is too 
high (E(ε)>0), then the injurer has incentives to take optimal precaution 
and activity  (but optimal incentives are vulnerable to collusion).  
Proof: 
1. Consider two cases.  First, consider the case where the injurer expects to be no 
liable.  Thus assume that H is less than H*- E(ε).  Injurer will increase his payoff 
by increasing activity and decreasing precaution until he becomes liable, which 
occurs when H equals H*- E(ε).  Thus injurer will set H equal to H* if E(ε) is 
zero; injurer will set H  higher than H* if E(ε) is negative; injurer will set H lower 
than H* if E(ε) positive. 
2. Second, consider the case where the injurer expects to be liable.  Thus assume 
that H is greater than H*- E(ε) and injurer expects to be liable for H-H*+ E(ε).  
Minimizing injurer’s total costs with liability H-H*+ E(ε) is identical to 
minimizing total costs with liability H-H* but for the constant E(ε).  First order 
conditions are invariant with respect to changing the maximand by a constant.  
Consequently, the proof for Proposition 5 also proves that injurer will set H equal 
to H*.   
3. If the expected error is unbiased (E(ε)=0), then step 1 and step 2 indicate that 
injurer will set H equal to H*, which proves (i). 
4. If the expected error is biased towards a legal standard that is too low (E(ε)<0),  
then injurer will set H above H* and escape liability as indicated in step 1.  Since 
injurer already expects not to be liable, injurer would gain nothing from lowering 
H to H* as in step 2. 
5. If the expected error is biased towards a legal standard that is too high (E(ε)>0),  
then injurer will set H equal to H* as indicated in step 2.  
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